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Abstract 
 
We identify conditions under which a bargainer makes inefficiently large (small) 
investments in search for information about the opponent’s reservation price. The 
analysis starts with the observation that a player will invest too much (too little) if the 
opponent’s expected payoff is decreasing (increasing) in the probability that the player 
gets information. We develop comparative static results about over- and under-
investment as a function of the efficiency and distributional properties of mechanisms, 
their dependence on search outcomes, and the nature of the trading problem. The results 
do not depend on any specific bargaining mechanism and are illustrated in several 
examples.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The paper contributes a building block towards a formal theory of institutions by 
looking at a class of “haggling” (Coase, 1937) or “rent-seeking” (Tullock, 1980) costs. 
Specifically, we identify conditions under which a bargainer engages in too little or too 
much search for information about the opponent’s reservation value. Our conditions 
apply to any bargaining games, but are still surprisingly simple. The key trade off is that 
information acquisition has a surplus-increasing component as well as a rent-seeking 
component, and whether there is under- or over-investment depends on the relative size 
of these two components. Our main result is that a player will be willing to invest too 
much (little) to acquire information which, if he had it, would reduce (increase) the 
expected value of the opponent’s payoffs. There is more scope for this if the pre (post) 
search mechanism is more (less) efficient, if the pre (post) search mechanism gives the 
opponent a higher (lower) share, and if the first best probability of trade in the pre-search 
trading problem are larger. For example, a player will invest too much trying to get a 
signal which would allow him to appropriate all surplus. 
The search behavior modeled here would often be seen as “market research” and 
is subject to both regulation and subsidy. On one hand, there are limits to the information 
that may be collected and asked for, and on the other hand governments help market 
researchers by making certain types of information available. The central message of the 
paper is that one ought to pay attention to the bargaining power conferred by the 
information. To the extent that the information enhances the efficiency of trade, one 
would want the seller to gain some – not too much and not too little - bargaining power 
by becoming informed.  
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Broad evidence suggests that bargainers with better information about their 
opponents tend to achieve superior results (Busse, Silva-Risso, and Zettelmeyer, 2006; 
Richtel, 2008). Perhaps because of this, purchasing agents spend more time preparing to 
negotiate than actually doing so (Bradley), and some firms prohibit non-procurement 
employees from having contact with suppliers (Simester and Knez, 2002). Such attempts 
to gather information, or raise the opponent’s costs of doing so, are suggestive of the 
forces driving our result. 
The paper has no close cousins, but contributes to knowledge in two areas. It is 
the first paper to go beyond a reduced form representation of bargaining costs incurred 
before the bargaining process and the first paper to look at the possibility of under-
investment as well as over-investment. The literature has offered reduced form models in 
which there always is over-investment (e. g. Tullock, 1980; Ashenfelter and Bloom, 
1993).  
In the area of pre-play information acquisition, it is the first paper to offer results 
that do not depend on a specific mechanism and the first paper to look specifically at 
bargaining. There are many deep works in this area, focused on different auctions 
(Cremer, Spiegel, and Zheng, 2006; 2009), ultimatum games (Gehrig, Guth, and 
Levinsky, 2006), and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves scheme (Bergemann and Valimaki, 
2002; Bergemann, Shi, and Valimaki, 2009). These papers give regions in which there 
will be over- or under-investment in information, contingent on a specific mechanism 
being played.
 1
 Our contribution is complementary and akin to comparative statics 
between mechanisms. We predict whether equilibrium will exhibit over- or under-
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 Conditions for over- vs. under-nvestment have also been investigated in other contexts such as labor 
training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999.) 
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investment as a function of efficiency and distributional properties of mechanisms, the 
way in which these depend on search outcomes, and the nature of the trading problem.
2
 
We apply the results to several examples, each showing that two seemingly similar 
trading problems can lead to very different search behaviors. 
After introducing the model and presenting the main arguments in Section 2, we 
look at the examples in Section 3. The paper ends with a brief discussion. 
 
 2. MODEL AND MAIN RESULTS 
 We are looking at a trading problem with a single object, one seller and one 
buyer. Seller and buyer have private knowledge about their valuations, c and v, 
respectively. Uncertainty is represented by a set of possible states of the world Ωc x Ωv, 
where Ωc and Ωv are compact subsets of the positive reals. Anticipating future needs, we 
will denote the lower bound of Ωv by v. Both players know that the seller’s cost c is 
drawn from the atomless (prior) distribution Gp: Ωc → [0, 1] and that the buyer’s 
valuation v is drawn independently from the also atomless Fp: Ωv → [0, 1].  
If the players bargain without gathering further information, they play the pre-
search mechanism which we will index by p (for prior). Appealing to the revelation 
principle, we will represent p by the corresponding incentive compatible direct 
mechanism. Under this mechanism the object is transferred with probability qp(c, v), 
while the buyer pays the seller an expected amount ap(c, v). So for a given (c, v), the 
seller’s expected payoffs are  
Πp(c, v) = ap(c, v) - qp(c, v)c,                                                 (1) 
                                                 
2
 Persico (2000) derives several general conditions about incentives to acquire information in decision 
problems, but is focused on auctions, rather than bargaining. 
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while the buyer’s expected payoffs are  
Up(c, v) = - ap(c, v) + qp(c, v)v.                                             (2) 
We assume that the game is ex interim individually rational such that EvΠp(c) ≥ 0 for all 
c Ωc and EcUp(v) ≥ 0 for all v  Ωv. 
Instead of playing p, the seller can acquire information beyond his priors by 
receiving a noisy signal about the buyer’s valuation. The seller may observe a signal with 
probability e [0, 1] by incurring search cost k(e). We assume that the signal is drawn 
from the finite set Y, that k(0)=0, that k( ) is continuous and convex, and that k(e) → ∞ as 
e → 1. After observing the realized signal y, the seller uses Bayes’ rule to revise his prior 
probability density fp(v) to a posterior f(v│y). If the probability of observing y given t Ωv 
is μ(y│t), then 
f(v│y) = μ(y│v)fp(v)/[∫μ(y│t)dFp(t)].                                           (3) 
We assume that all these posteriors are atomless and for convenience also that they have 
the same support as fp(v). 
To maximize the transparency of the argument, we make two simplifying 
assumptions about the nature of search. First, to ensure that posteriors are common 
knowledge, we assume that the buyer observes the signals. Second, to avoid 
complications from search decisions being used to signal valuations, we assume that the 
seller decides on search before observing his own valuation.
3
 These assumptions are 
discussed in Section 4. 
If the seller observes y, the players bargain based on fy( │y) and gp( ), using the 
post-search mechanism indexed by (y). If the seller searches but fails to observe a signal, 
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 Most papers in the literature use formulations in which these complications are avoided. (i. e. Bergemann 
and Valimaki, 2002).  
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they play the pre-search mechanism. We make no assumptions about the relationship 
between the pre and post-search mechanisms, nor about the relationship between the 
mechanisms played after different search outcomes. We represent all these mechanisms 
by the corresponding incentive compatible direct mechanisms. So for the mechanism (y), 
the object is transferred with probability qy(c, v│y), the buyer pays the seller an expected 
amount ay(c, v│y), and the expected payoffs are  
Π(c, v│y) = ay(c, v│y) – qy(c, v│y)c – k(e),                                (4) 
and  
U(c, v│y) = - ay(c, v│y) + qy(c, v│y)v.                                   (5) 
  Recapitulating, the sequence of events in each of our trading problems is as 
follows: 
1. The seller makes a search decision e. 
2. The seller and buyer learn c and v, respectively. They both learn the value (y) of any 
signal received.  
3. The payoffs are distributed.  
In equilibrium, the seller will select e
o
 =Argmax EΠ(e), while the efficient search 
investments are e*=Argmax{EU(e) + EΠ(e)}. This motivates the following simple, but 
very useful, observation: 
 
 Lemma 1: e
o 
> e* if and only if EcvyU(c, v│y) < EcvU(c, v).
4
  
 
                                                 
4
 I am indebted to a referee for pointing out that there is a close correspondence between the Lemma and 
Acemoglu and Pischke’s (1999, 1998) result, that the amount of employer-provided training depends on the 
extent to which the marginal benefit for the firm reflects the social benefit of training. 
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Proof: Social return to investment is maximized at k’(e*) = ∂[EU(e) + EΠ(e)]/∂e, while 
the seller’s private return is maximized at k’(eo) =  ∂EΠ(e)/∂e. So the two are identical if 
∂EU(e)/∂e = 0. Since k(e) is convex, ∂EU(e)/∂e < 0 implies e*< eo, while ∂EU(e)/∂e > 0 
implies e* > e
o
. 
Q. E. D.  
In words, the seller will invest too much (little) if the buyer’s ex ante expected payoff 
when the seller gets information is smaller (larger) than his ex ante expected payoff if the 
seller does not get information. 
We now rewrite payoffs in a couple of ways to focus on how different 
components change as the seller gets better information. This allows us to associate these 
changes with properties of the pre- and post-search mechanisms, as well as the trading 
problem itself. The two angles give somewhat similar insights, but there are differences, 
and in any given application, one format may be easier to evaluate than the other. 
By using the envelope theorem on the IC constraint, we can rewrite the expected 
payoff of a buyer with valuation v’ when the seller observes a specific y’ as5    
EcU(c, v’│y’) = EcU(c, v’│y’) + ∫
 v’
Ecqy’(c,tv│y’)dtv.                                          (6) 
Taking the expectation over v’ and y’ allows us to restate Lemma 1 as 
 
Lemma 1A: e
o 
> e* if and only if  
∑Y∫∫
t∫qy(tc, tv│ty )dGp(tc)dtvμ(ty│t)dFp(t) - ∫∫
t∫qp(tc, tv)dGp(tc)dtvdFp(t). 
<  ∫U(tc, v)dGp(tc) - ∑Y∫U(tc, v│ty)dGp(tc)μ(ty│v)                           (7) 
 
                                                 
5
 See also Theorem 1 in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) 
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While we have not specified how the mechanisms vary with information, we will look at 
several different scenarios. First, we might assume that information causes the expected 
probability of trade to be weakly larger.  
                       Ecyqy(c, v│y) ≥ Ecqp(c, v) for all v  Ωv.                                        (A1) 
This is not unreasonable if the mechanisms are more or less the same regardless of 
information (although we look at a counter-example in Section 3). One might also 
assume that information causes the expected payoffs to the lowest type buyer to be 
weakly larger. 
EcU(c, v) ≤ EcyU(c, v│y).                                                   (A2) 
This is stronger, but we would expect the low types to benefit most from the seller getting 
better information. A sufficient condition for (A2) is that EcU(c, v) = 0. Since the IR 
constraints are slack if EcU(c, v) > 0, (A2) is a very reasonable assumption in at least 
some economic settings. In any case, we have  
 
Finding 1: Given (A1) and (A2), the seller will under-invest.  
 
Second, if the pre-search mechanism implements all trades with probability one, the left 
hand side of (7) is at most zero and we will get over-investment if the left side is positive. 
So if 
Ecqp(c, v) = 1 for all c, v  Ωc  x Ωv                                                (A3) 
and 
EcU(c, v) > EcyU(c, v│y).                                                   (A4) 
we have 
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Finding 2: Given (A3) and (A4), the seller will over-invest. 
  
We can also use continuity to immediately get several comparative static type results. 
 
Finding 3: Suppose there are two trading problems T1 and T2 which are identical in all 
but one of the four terms in (7). Under either of the following circumstances, 
(3.1) expected payoffs to the lowest type in the pre-search mechanism are higher in T2, 
(3.2) expected payoffs to the lowest type in the post-search mechanism are lower in T2, 
(3.3) the probability distribution of trade in the pre-search mechanism in T2 first order 
stochastically dominates that in T1, and 
(3.4) the probability distribution of trade in the post-search mechanism in T2 is first order 
stochastically dominated by that in T1,  
then, if there is over-investment in T1, there must be over-investment in T2 and there may 
be over-investment in T2, but not in T1.
6
 
 
Another way to develop intuition about Lemma 1 is to look directly at the effects 
of information on total surplus and the informational rents accruing to the buyer. To this 
end, we denote total expected surplus by β(y) and the buyer’s expected share of it by α(y), 
with β(0) and α(0) referring to the pre-search mechanism. With this notation, we can 
write the buyer’s expected payoff as e∑Y β(y)α(y)∫μ(y│t)dFp(t) + (1-e)β(0)α(0), the 
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 In the interest of brevity, we omit the symmetric Finding about under-investment. 
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marginal effect of seller search is proportional to ∑Y β(y)α(y)∫μ(y│t)dFp(t) - β(0)α(0), and 
we have 
 
Lemma 1B: e
o 
> e* if and only if  
 Ey [β(y) - β(0)]α(y) <  Ey β(0)[α(0) - α(y)]                       (8) 
 
This formulation throws a slightly different light on the relationship between over- and 
under-investment and the way in which the mechanisms vary with information. The 
seller’s incentives to over-invest are larger when the expected efficiency gain β(y) - β(0) 
is smaller or the expected decrease in the buyer’s informational rents α(0) - α(y) is larger.  
 Recall that efficiency and shares are subject to ceiling effects. So if the pre-search 
mechanism implements all efficient trades,  
Ecqp(c, v) = 1 for all c < v  Ωc  x Ωv                                                (A5) 
and the buyer’s expected post-search share is smaller than the pre-search share 
α(0) > Ey α(y),                                                              (A6) 
we have 
 
Finding 4: Given (A5) and (A6), the seller will over-invest.  
 
Similarly, if the post-search mechanism gives all surplus to the seller, 
             α(y) = 0 for all y  Ωv,                                                    (A7) 
we have 
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Finding 5: Given (A7), the seller will over-invest.  
 
This would, for example, apply to trading problems in which search gives the seller 
perfect information and the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. 
Much like we did with (7), we can use (8) and continuity to get several simple 
comparative static type results. 
 
Finding 6: Suppose there are two trading problems T1 and T2 which are identical in all 
but one of the four terms in (8). Under either of the following circumstances, 
(6.1) expected surplus in the pre-search mechanism are higher in T2, 
(6.2) expected surplus in the post-search mechanism are lower in T2, 
(6.3) the buyer’s expected share of surplus is higher in the pre-search mechanism in T2, 
and 
(6.4) the buyer’s expected share of surplus is lower in the post-search mechanism in T2, 
then, if there is over-investment in T1, there must be over-investment in T2 and there may 
be over-investment in T2, but not in T1.
7
 
 
Consider finally a comparison between two mechanisms. Suppose that the two 
trading problems T1 and T2 face the same priors and the same search technology (and 
thus the same posteriors), and only differ because T1 uses the bargaining mechanism M1 
at all information sets, while T2 uses M2 at all information sets. Now assume 
α1(y) = α2(y) for all y, α1(0) =α2(0), and α(0) > Eα(y),                        (A8)  
                                                 
7
 In the interest of brevity, we again omit the symmetric Finding about under-investment. 
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(M1 and M2 split the surplus identically at all information sets and the buyer can expect a 
smaller share after search),  
and  
β1(0) >β2(0))  and  β1(y) - β1(0) < β2(y) - β2(0)  for all y ≠ 0.                    (A9)  
(M1 is more efficient at the prior and gains less efficiency between the prior and any 
posterior, possibly because of ceiling effects. This gives 
 
Finding 7: Suppose the two trading problems T1 and T2 face the same priors and the 
same search technology,  that T1 uses the bargaining mechanism M1 at all information 
sets, that T2 uses M2 at all information sets, and that A(8) and A(9) hold. Then there is 
less investment in T1,which uses the ex ante more efficient mechanism.  
 
Proof: In terms of the marginal effects of search, (A8) and (A9) imply that  
∑Y β1(y)α1(y)∫μ(y│t)dFp(t) – β1(0)α1(0) 
= ∑Y [β1(y) - β1(0)] α(y)∫μ(y│t)dFp(t) – β1(0)[α(0) - Eα(y)] 
< ∑Y [β2(y) – β2(0)] α(y)∫μ(y│t)dFp(t) – β2(0)[α(0) - Eα(y)] 
= ∑Y β2(y)α2(y)∫μ(y│t)dFp(t) – β2(0)α2(0)                                  (9) 
So the incentives to search are larger in M2. 
Q. E. D. 
 
In other words, under the stated conditions, the more efficient mechanism is associated 
with less over-investment or more under-investment. 
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3. EXAMPLES 
3.1 More Scope for Over-investment when Pre-search Trade is Closer to Efficient. 
 We  first illustrate the logic from Findings 3.3 and 6.1, that ceiling effects 
generate more scope for over-investment when the pre-search mechanism is closer to 
being fully efficient. To this end, we use the sealed bid double auction analyzed by 
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) to illustrate that the seller will over-invest if the first 
best probability of trade is sufficiently high. To this end we compare a “high probability” 
case in which the priors Gp( ), Fp( ) are uniform distributions over [0, 1] and [1/2, 3/2], 
respectively, against a “low probability” case in which they are uniform on [1/2, 2/3] and 
[0, 1]. In either case we assume that signals may be either “high” or “low”, Y = {h, l}, 
perfectly revealing whether the buyer’s valuation is in the upper or lower half of the 
support.  
Since the seller can refrain from searching, search and receive good news, or 
search and receive bad news, bargaining takes place under one of three possible 
information structures. We assume that the same sealed bid bargaining game is played in 
all cases. Specifically, seller and buyer submit sealed offers, S and B, respectively. The 
object and a payment are transferred if and only if B ≥ S, and the payment equals the 
average of the two bids (B + S)/2. 
 Using the notation that F() is uniform between v and vb, while G( ) is uniform 
between  c and ch, we can generalize Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) to show that the 
seller’s equilibrium bidding strategy is  
                      S(c) = 2v/3 + vh/12 + c/4     for c < v – vh/4 + c/4 
          = 2c/3 + vh/4 + c/12     for v – vh/4+ c/4 ≤ c ≤3vh/4+ c/4   
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                              ≥ 2c/3 + vh/4 + c/12      for 3vh/4+ c/4< c,                                      (9)             
while the buyer’s equilibrium bidding strategy is 
                          B(v) ≤ 2v/3 + vh/12 + c/4       for v < vh/4 + 3c/4                                     
                                 = 2v/3 + vh/12 + c/4       for vh/4 + 3c/4 ≤ v ≤ch + vh/4 - c/4         
                                 = 2ch/3 + vh/4 + c/12      for ch + vh  - c/4 < v.                             (10) 
The sealed bid double auction is thus not incentive compatible in the sense that the bids 
do not correspond to the underlying values. However, we will use Lemma1 on the 
incentive compatible direct mechanism implementing the same outcomes. We consider 
three cases, that the seller gets no news, bad news, or good news. 
In the “high probability” game, if the seller gets no news, (9) and (10) gives  
S(c) = 11/24               for c < 1/8 
                                                    = 2c/3 + 3/8         for c ≥ 1/8 
and 
B(v) = 2v/3 + 1/8     for v < 11/8 
                                                     = 25/24              for v ≥ 11/8 
From these, expected payoffs to the lowest type buyer are 1/192 and the probability of 
trade as a function of v is v – 3/8 for v < 11/8 and 1 for v ≥ 11/8. After simple calculation, 
we find that the expected payoff to the buyer is 719/3072 ≈ .234.  If the seller gets good 
news, the expected payoffs to the lowest type buyer are (5/8)(5/24) = 25/192 and the 
buyer’s expected payoffs are ≈ .327. If the seller gets bad news, the expected payoffs to 
the lowest type buyer are 1/48, while the buyer’s expected payoffs are ≈ .125. As good 
and bad news are equally likely, the buyer’s expected payoff, if the seller searches, is 
(.327 +.125)/2 ≈ .226. So Lemma1 tells us that the seller will over-invest. 
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In the “low probability” game, if the seller gets no news, the buyer’s expected 
payoff is 9/1024 ≈.0088. Further, the buyer’s expected payoff is 0 if the seller gets bad 
news and 18/1024 if he gets good news.  So in this case the buyer’s expected payoff is 
the same (9/1024) whether or not the seller gets information, implying that the latter 
neither over-invests, nor under-invests.  
 
3.2 More Scope for Over-investment with more Efficient Mechanisms   
We now illustrate Finding 7, if the pre and post-search mechanisms are the same, 
there is more scope for over-investment the more efficient this mechanism is. To this end, 
we contrast the “more efficient” mechanism identified by Myerson and Satterthwaite 
(1983) with a “less efficient” mechanism that lets each player make a TIOLI offer with 
probability .5. The priors, Fp( ) and Gp( ), are both uniform distributions over [0, 1], Y = 
{h, l} and μ(h│v) = v. So the posteriors are fh(v│h) = 2v  and fl(v│l) =2(1 – v). In both 
cases, we  assume that all three bargaining games, that under the prior information 
structure, that under fh(v│h), gp(c ), and that under fl(v│l), gp(c ), are governed by the 
same mechanism. 
 The “more efficient” mechanism is such that  
q
α(c, v) = 1   if c + α G(c)/g(c) ≤  v – α[1 – F(v)]/f(v), 
q
α(c, v) = 0   if c + α G(c)/g(c) > v – α[1 – F(v)]/f(v), 
and 
∫∫{tv – [1 – F(tv)]/f(tv) - tc – G(tc)/g(tc)}q
α
(tc, tv)g(tc)f(tv)dtcdtv= 0 
If the seller gets no news, α = 1/3 and the probability of trade is 0 for v < ¼ and v – ¼ for 
v ≥ ¼. If the seller gets good news, α ≈ .35 and the probability of trade is 0 for v < .385 
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and .871v – .129/v for v ≥ .385. Conversely, if the seller gets bad news, α ≈ .22 and the 
probability of trade is 0 for v < .097 and .911v – .089 for v ≥ .097. The buyer’s expected 
payoffs when the seller does and does not search is ≈ .067 and ≈ .070, respectively, 
implying over-investment.  
 In the “less efficient” mechanism each player makes a TIOLI offer with 
probability .5. If the buyer makes the offer, her expected payoffs will be 1/12 whether or 
not the seller has received any information. If the seller makes the offer, the buyer can 
expect 1/24, .587.., or 2/81 depending on whether the seller has received no information, 
good news, or bad news. So the buyer’s expected payoffs when the seller does and does 
not search is ≈.0633 and .0625, respectively, implying under-investment. 
 
3.3 More Scope for Under-investment if the Post-Search Mechanism is More Efficient 
We now illustrate the logic from Findings 3.4 and 6.2, that there is more scope for 
under-investment if the post-search mechanism is more efficient. To liven things up, we 
look at an example with different pre and post-search mechanisms. The priors, Fp( ) and 
Gp( ), are uniform distributions over [0, 2] and [0, 1], respectively, Y = {h, l} and the 
seller’s posterior is  uniform on [0,1] or (1, 2] depending on the signal received. We 
assume that the parties play the most efficient mechanism under the prior or if the seller 
gets bad news, but we contrast two mechanisms for the case in which the seller gets good 
news.  The “more efficient” mechanism prescribes trade at the price 1, and the “less 
inefficient” mechanism has each player making a TIOLI offer with probability .5.  
We proceed as in the previous example to find that the buyer’s expected payoffs 
without search are .271, while they are .070 after bad news. After good news, the “more 
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efficient” mechanism gives the buyer expected payoffs of .5, while the “less efficient” 
mechanism only gives 7/16. So the buyer’s expected payoffs after search are .285 and 
.254, respectively, and the “more efficient” post-search mechanism gives under-
investment, while the “less efficient” mechanism gives over-investment. 
 
3.4 Fully Informative Signals and TIOLI Offers Lead to Over-investment 
We finally illustrate the force in Finding 6.4 that mechanisms allowing a better 
informed player to appropriate most or all of the opponent’s payoffs give more scope for 
over-investment. Suppose that each player gets to make a TIOLI offer with probability .5 
and that y = v such that the seller potentially gets complete information. If the buyer 
makes the offer, her expected payoffs are the same with and without search. However, if 
the seller makes the offer after search, the buyer gets zero payoffs. So the seller will over-
invest. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
The paper contributes to two literatures; it partially unpacks a class of bargaining 
costs and it addresses the question of pre-play information acquisition from a new angle. 
We will discuss each in turn. 
Costless (“Coasian”) bargaining is a widely used and extremely convenient 
assumption in economic models. However, if bargaining costs are of non-trivial 
magnitude, this assumption blinds us to agents’ attempts at designing institutions that 
economize on them. Informal theories of economic institutions long have argued for the 
central importance of concepts such as “haggling costs” and “rent seeking” (Coase, 1937; 
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Williamson, 1975; Tullock, 1980), both of which have received little explicit treatment in 
the more formal literature. Consistent with this, some observers feel that ideas are more 
likely to be used by others once they are “embalmed” in a workhorse formal model 
(Krugman, 1995, p. 27). A possible contribution of the present paper is to provide a 
model of bargaining costs that is simple enough to be incorporated in larger models 
(Wernerfelt, 2010) and yet is consistent with standard assumptions.    
The existing literature on pre-play information acquisition uses a “bottom up” 
approach; assuming that a particular mechanism is used throughout, it looks for 
properties of the trading problem and the search process under which there will be too 
little, too much, or just the right amount of search. We have here taken the opposite, “top 
down”, approach, by looking for efficiency as a function of properties of mechanisms, the 
way in which they depend on search outcomes, and the nature of the trading problem. 
Our comparative static results are not as deep as those developed by the bottom up 
literature, but they do throw new and complementary light on the problem. Furthermore, 
our examples show that the results are sufficiently strong to identify important 
differences between seemingly quite similar mechanisms and trading problems. 
The extensive form analyzed is subject to two critiques: The search decision does not 
depend on valuations and the outcomes of search are assumed to be publicly observable. 
While these points are well taken, they are not universally valid. In some cases the 
objects of bargain are revealed very shortly before agreements have to be finalized, 
forcing the parties to investigate each others’ “type” well in advance of knowing 
valuations (e. g. many labor services). In other cases opponents have to be asked or 
informed about information (e. g. if they are obligated to give out information on request 
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or if a third party, such as a credit bureau has to inform them of any search activity). 
Finally, there are cases in which only one signal is relevant and yet is of uncertain 
availability (e. g. an old expert opinion on an antique).  We nevertheless admit that the 
critiques have significant force and we will now discuss how one can generalize the 
analysis in each of the two directions thus indicated 
Suppose first that we change the extensive form such that the seller’s search decision 
is made after he learns his valuation. The complication here is that the buyer can use the 
seller’s search outcome as a noisy signal of his costs. We can write the mechanisms as 
a(c, v| y, e
o
) and q(c, v| y, e
o
),, where e
o 
denotes the search strategy e
o
(tc) for all tc Ωc. 
The complicated way these mechanisms may depend on the players’ information means 
that we cannot invoke the Fan-Glicksberg existence theorem, nor the second order 
conditions, without making very strong restrictions on the class of mechanisms used.  
 Instead, we can gain intuition by pursuing another approach. In most natural 
bargaining games, a( ) and q( ) are such that stronger players will find information more 
valuable; the subjective probability of trade is higher as are the marginal returns from 
making it happen. This suggests that both the efficient search strategy e* and the 
equilibrium search strategy e
o
 are decreasing. However, since seller will want the buyer 
to think that he is weak, the buyer’s ability to draw inferences about the seller’s search 
intensity will lower his equilibrium incentives to search. So compared to the model 
analyzed in Section 2, we should here expect a greater tendency to under-invest.  
Consider now an extensive form in which the seller’s search outcomes remain his 
private information. Since the buyer’s strategy in general will depend on the seller’s 
beliefs, this causes issues with the Common Knowledge of Common Prior assumption. It 
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is not clear that the current literature offers a good general solution to this problem. 
However, in the present context, we can still salvage some results by restricting attention 
to mechanisms in which each player’s bargaining strategy is independent of the 
opponent’s information. While this is a strong requirement, it is met by many commonly 
studied mechanisms with a flavor of second price auctions and take-it-or-leave-it offers. 
Beyond the two issues discussed above, a possible avenue for future research is to 
characterize different classes of mechanisms in a way that can sharpen the comparative 
static results. This might ultimately allow us to merge the bottom up and top down 
perspectives.  
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